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Insights into an Emerging Relationship: Use of Regional Human 
Rights Jurisprudence at the International Criminal Court 
  
ABSTRACT 
This article uses the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) first case, Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanaga Dylio, as a lens through which to examine the ICC’s use of regional human rights 
jurisprudence. Content analysis of 595 judicial decisions has been used to provide an in-
depth insight into the use of regional human rights jurisprudence in the early years of the 
Court’s operation. The analysis reveals frequent reference to, and reliance on, human rights 
jurisprudence across the Court’s three judicial divisions, throughout all stages of the  Court’s 
proceedings. It also indicates a lack of clarity in the Court’s reasoning as to how reference to 
regional human rights jurisprudence fits within the ICC’s legal framework and its impact on 
judicial reasoning. It is argued that whilst the tendency of the Court’s judges to refer to 
regional human rights jurisprudence in the Lubanga case is highly beneficial, both for the 
Court and the development of international law more generally, the ambiguities 
surrounding the Court’s practice raise several interrelated concerns. Each of these concerns 
can be addressed through a clearer articulation of the Court’s methodology, which explains 
the use of regional human rights jurisprudence by reference to the ICC’s rules of applicable 
law and interpretation.  
KEYWORDS: judicial interaction, regional human rights courts, European Court of 
Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, International Criminal Court, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, the judges of 
the ICC faced a momentous task. They were called upon to bring the detailed provisions of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to life and to resolve 
the numerous gaps, ambiguities and inconsistencies that can be found in its text.1 Speaking 
in 2010, the President of the Trial Division of the ICC, Judge Adrian Fulford, explained that 
“[e]ven following the best part of a decade since its establishment, the strong feeling remains 
that so much is still in the process of being established. Indeed, hardly a day goes by without 
me scratching my head and wondering: ‘gosh, how are we going to deal with this one?’”.2   
                                                          
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 July 2002, 2187 
UNTS 3.  
2 Fulford, “The Reflections of a Trial Judge” (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 215, at 215.  
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As the judges of the ICC have interpreted and applied the provisions of the Rome Statute for 
the first time, they have done so against the background of a large body of relevant 
jurisprudence, produced by a range of other international, regional and domestic courts and 
tribunals. A significant body of relevant case law has been produced by regional human 
rights courts, in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Whilst these institutions are tasked with 
determining the (civil) responsibility of States, rather than the (criminal) responsibility of 
individuals, they have considered many issues that the judges of the ICC will be called upon 
to address, including the definition of human rights violations that amount to international 
crimes, the permissibility of amnesties and immunities in respect of such offences, the rights 
of victims that have been affected by their commission and the meaning and scope of fair 
trial standards. 
The way in which the ICC’s judges refer to and use regional human rights jurisprudence has 
wide-ranging and significant implications. It has the potential to affect the quality of the 
ICC’s case law, the way in which the Court is perceived by external actors and the interests 
of different stakeholders in its proceedings. In addition to its repercussions for the Court and 
its stakeholders, the ICC’s engagement with regional human rights jurisprudence has much 
broader implications for the coherence of international law. It must be understood light of 
concerns that the proliferation of international courts and tribunals could allow for the 
fragmentation of international law as judges from different institutions address similar 
issues of law and fact without any formal obligation to refer to one another.3 Despite the 
importance of the issue, the use of regional human rights jurisprudence in judicial decision-
making at the ICC remains largely unexplored.  
The purpose of this article is to assess the approach that the judges of the ICC have taken to 
regional human rights jurisprudence throughout the pre-trial and trial proceeding at the ICC 
in the case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (the Lubanga case). The focus has been 
placed on pre-trial and trial proceedings in a single case in order to offer a more 
comprehensive account of the Court’s use of regional human rights jurisprudence than that 
provided by studies which have examined the interaction between the ICC and human 
rights courts in final, or select, decisions of the ICC, or in relation to specific norms, such as 
the prohibition of torture or compliance with fair trial standards.4 By focusing on a single 
case, it is possible to show how regional human rights jurisprudence has been used 
throughout all stages of the pre-trial and trial process, in relation to a wide range of 
procedural and substantive issues, by all three judicial divisions of the Court.  
                                                          
3 See below at Section 2.A. 
4 See, for example, de Frouville, “The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on 
International Criminal Law of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment” (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 633; Croquet, “The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of 
Defence Rights: A Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?” (2011) 11(1) 
Human Rights Law Review 91.   
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The Lubanga case is an important point of focus because it was the first case to be completed 
by the ICC, and the case that led to the Court’s first conviction.5 The case concerned fairly 
narrow charges, namely the conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers as war crimes 
under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. However, throughout the pre-trial and trial 
proceedings, the judges of the ICC addressed a wide range of procedural and evidentiary 
issues for the first time. In doing so, they provided a foundation for many aspects of the 
ICC’s jurisprudence and produced decisions that have been returned to frequently in 
subsequent proceedings. 
In order to provide an insight into the Court’s approach, the article presents analysis of 595 
of the Court’s decisions, produced by a total of sixteen judges over an eight-year period in 
the Lubanga case.6 The sample of decisions encompasses all publicly available English 
language decisions produced by the Court between the issuance of an arrest warrant against 
the accused in February 2006 and the final decisions of the Appeals Chamber on appeal of 
conviction and sentence in December 2014.7 The analysis indicates that a strong relationship 
is forming between the ICC and regional human rights courts, and between the ICC and the 
ECtHR in particular. It is argued that whilst this relationship is beneficial for the ICC and for 
the development of international law more generally, trends identified in the Court’s 
decisions raise several interrelated concerns. Each of these concerns could be addressed 
through the development of more precise judicial reasoning, which situates reference to 
regional human rights jurisprudence within the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation.  
The remainder of the article is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 begins by highlighting the 
significance of the ICC’s interaction with regional human rights jurisprudence. Section 3 sets 
out the legal framework that governs the interaction between the ICC and regional human 
rights courts. Section 4 examines the ICC’s approach to regional human rights jurisprudence 
in the Lubanga case. Section 5 goes on to discuss the implications of the Court’s approach 
and the issues raised by lack of clarity in the Court’s reasoning. Section 6 proposes how such 
clarity could be achieved. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 
March 2012.  
6 The judges include: in the Pre-Trial Chamber, Judge Jorda, Judge Kuenyehia, Judge Steiner; in the 
Trial Chamber Judge Fulford, Judge Odio Benito and Judge Blattman; and in the Appeals Chamber, 
Judge Pikis, Judge Kirsch, Judge Pillay, Judge Song, Judge Koroula, Judge Nsereko, Judge Usaska, 
Judge Van den Wyngaert, Judge Monageng and Judge Trendafilova.  
7 The analysis is based on decisions publicly available through the ICC’s Legal Tools as of August, 
2015. See  https://www.legal-tools.org/en/go-to-database/.  
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2.  REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ICC: THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERACTION 
Regional human rights courts have produced a wealth of jurisprudence on issues of 
relevance to the ICC, raising the question of when, if at all, the ICC’s judges should turn to it 
in the interpretation and application of the Court’s substantive and procedural law. The 
sections below outline a range of positive and negative implications associated with the 
Court’s engagement with regional human rights jurisprudence. Whilst the beneficial 
implications provide a strong justification for the Court’s engagement with regional human 
rights jurisprudence, the negative implications can be minimised by the judges of the ICC, in 
part through the development of clear judicial reasoning.  
A. The Coherence of International Law 
Perhaps the most obvious benefit associated with reference to regional human rights 
jurisprudence in judicial decision-making at the ICC is its potential to contribute to the 
coherence of international law on issues that cross the boundary between international 
criminal law and human rights law. The willingness of the judges of the ICC to engage with 
external jurisprudence has significance against the backdrop of concerns that the 
adjudication of similar issues before different, and formally unconnected, judicial 
mechanisms could result in the fragmentation of international law.8 Fragmented 
jurisprudence is undesirable because of its potential to affect the certainty and clarity of the 
law, which, in turn, has implications for its fairness, effectiveness and perceived legitimacy.9 
Academic literature on the fragmentation of international law has repeatedly highlighted 
the important role that judges can play in promoting coherence through informal inter-
institutional interaction, including reference to the case law of other judicial institutions.10 
                                                          
8 For discussion of the threat of fragmentation in international law, see Symposium in (1999) 31 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics; Symposium in (2003-2004) 25 Michigan Journal 
of International Law; Koskenniemi and Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties” (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553; Charney, “Is International Law Threatened 
by Multiple International Tribunals?” (1998) 271 Recueil des Cours 101. See also Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law” 
(A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April 2006, at 1. 
9 For discussion of the connection between the coherence of international law and its legitimacy, see 
Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 82(4) The American Journal of International Law 
705, at 735-51. 
10 Charney, supra n 8; Guillaume, “Advantages and Risks of Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action” 
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 300, at 302; Burke-White, “International Legal 
Pluralism” (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 963, at 971-73; Teitel and Howse, “Cross-
Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order” (2008-2009) 41 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Politics 959, at 964-67; Ulfstein, “International Courts and 
Judges: Independence, Interaction and Legitimacy” (2014) 46 New York University Journal of 
international Law and Politics 849, at 858.  
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The ICC’s engagement with external jurisprudence has additional significance because of 
the Court’s status as the only permanent international criminal court and, consequently, its 
potential to influence the reasoning of other judicial institutions tasked with the adjudication 
of international crimes.   
The potential for fragmentation in the case law of the ICC and regional human rights courts 
is high because of the significant overlap in the legal and factual issues that they are called 
upon to address. It will be particularly visible when the ICC and human rights courts 
address human rights violations amounting to international crimes stemming from the same 
factual situations. Different approaches to the definition of human rights violations 
amounting to international crimes could have a significant impact on the strength of the 
message communicated by the ICC and regional human rights courts and their ability to 
deter the commission of future atrocities. Whilst fragmentation in the procedural law of the 
ICC and regional human rights jurisprudence may be less visible, since the factual issues 
addressed by the institutions are less likely to align, its impact on the clarity of the law could 
be equally detrimental. 
Of course, a degree of inconsistency in the case law of the ICC and regional human rights 
courts may sometimes be both necessary and desirable, given their differing functions and 
distinctions in their applicable law. The focus of international criminal law on the 
responsibility of individuals and human rights institutions on the responsibility of States 
may justify distinctions in the definitions of international crimes and parallel violations of 
human rights.11 The unique characteristics of international criminal proceedings have also 
been understood to justify an interpretation of fair trial standards that departs from human 
rights jurisprudence, which speaks to domestic proceedings.12 However, even where the ICC 
departs from the case law of regional human rights courts, the process of interaction has the 
benefit of ensuring that inconsistencies are not produced arbitrarily, but are based on clear 
reasoning.  
B. The Quality of the ICC’s Case Law 
Much of the existing literature on judicial interaction has focused on the implications of the 
practice for the coherence of international law.13 An equally significant benefit is the impact 
of judicial interaction on the quality of the Court’s own jurisprudence.  
                                                          
11 A key example is the definition of torture, which differs in international criminal law and human 
rights law. See Burchard, “Torture in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals: A Critical 
Assessment” (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159, 162-63.  
12 In one of its early decisions, the ICTY, for example, held that the principle of equality of arms “must 
be given a more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings before 
domestic courts”. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para 52.   
13 See, for example, Millar, “An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of ‘Precedent’ Across 
International Tribunals” (2002) 15(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 483. Brown, “The Cross-
Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and Remedies in the Jurisprudence of International 
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At the domestic level, comparative reasoning has been recognised as a valuable means of 
introducing new ideas into the judicial decision-making process, allowing judges to 
approach problems more creatively or with greater insight.14 In response to concerns about 
the risk of fragmentation in international law, a number of writers have emphasised the 
value of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals in providing greater scope for 
comparative reasoning and exchange of ideas at the international level.15 The exchange of 
ideas can serve to prompt greater depth of reasoning and, in doing so, enhance the quality of 
judicial decisions that are produced. 16 
The overlap in the applicable law of the ICC and regional human rights courts creates a 
strong basis for judicial interaction. Reference to the case law of established human rights 
courts may be particularly valuable in the early years of the ICC’s operation, when the 
judges of the Court are called upon to address issues for the first time without any prior ICC 
case law to refer to. However, the benefits of the practice are not confined to this period. 
Engagement with regional human rights jurisprudence could play a valuable role in the 
Court’s future years by preventing stagnation of the Court’s case law and prompting 
reconsideration of established approaches in light of broader changes in law and society.  
Even if the judges of the ICC decide to depart from the approaches taken by judges in 
regional human rights courts, the process of referring to and rejecting them could serve to 
enrich judicial debate and prompt stronger justifications for the approaches that are 
ultimately adopted. In this respect, interaction between the ICC and regional human rights 
courts can be viewed as beneficial regardless of whether or not it contributes to the 
coherence of international law.  
C. The Perceived Legitimacy of the ICC 
A further benefit of reference to regional human rights jurisprudence relates to the perceived 
legitimacy of the Court. In his discussion on the universality of international law, Judge 
Bruno Simma, former judge of the International Court of Justice, argued that “it will 
obviously add to the legitimacy of a judgment if an international court relies on the case law 
of other such courts, applies and maybe develops it, without, however, changing it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Courts and Tribunals” (2008) 30 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 219. See 
also n 10 above.  
14 Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) at 77.  
15 Charney, “The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and 
Tribunals” (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 697, at 700. Kingsbury, 
“Forward: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?” (1999) 31 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 679, at 681-82. 
16 On the connection between the depth of reasoning contained in judicial decisions and the quality of 
international case law, see Helfer and Slaughter, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication” (1997) 107 The Yale Journal of International Law 273, at 320-23. Charney, supra n 8, at 130. 
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fundamentally”.17 It does so not only by allowing judges to show that they have been 
constrained by the law,18 but also by providing evidence of support for the court’s reasoning. 
Evidence of conservatism and consensus is important in the international criminal context, 
where judicial decisions have significant implications not only for the rights and liberties of 
individuals, but also for the interests of States. Again, this benefit may be particularly great 
in the early years of the Court’s operation, when judges are called upon to address issues for 
the first time without their own case law to refer to.  
The legitimising effect of reference to external jurisprudence does, however, depend heavily 
on the perceived legitimacy of the institutions referred to and views on the appropriateness 
of referring to them. With this in mind, it is important to highlight two potentially negative 
implications of the Court’s reference to regional human rights jurisprudence, which raise 
concerns about the nature and scope of the interaction between the ICC and regional human 
rights courts.  
D. Cultural Bias 
One of the greatest concerns raised by the ICC’s reference to human rights case law is its 
potential to introduce cultural bias into the law of the Court and to undermine the 
perception of the Court as a truly international institution. This perception is crucial for the 
ICC’s universal acceptance and, in turn, its effectiveness in bringing the perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice. The risk is rooted in the fact that regional instruments and 
case law contain regional variations.19 Reference to the decisions of institutions representing 
specific regions of the world could lead the law of the ICC to disproportionately reflect 
certain regional views, values and concerns.  
If the judges of the ICC do refer to regional human rights jurisprudence, the potential for 
cultural bias is high. This is due to the unequal quantity of relevant jurisprudence that has 
been produced by different regional institutions, together with the fact that the regional 
human rights courts that exist do not represent all parts of the world. The risk is, however, 
one that can be addressed by judges in several ways. The first is by referring to a range of 
regional institutions whenever it is possible and appropriate to do so.20 This can help to 
show that particular approaches or points of reasoning are not regionally specific, but 
                                                          
17 Simma, “Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner” (2009) 20(2) 
European Journal of International Law 265, at 279. 
18 Dothan, “How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy” (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
455, at 471. 
19 Dupre, “Globalisation and Judicial Reasoning: Building Blocks for a Method of Interpretation” in 
Halpin and Roeben, Theorising the Global Legal Order (2009) at 115; Sheppard, “The International 
Criminal Court and ‘Internationally Recognized Human Rights’: Understanding Article 21(3) of the 
Rome Statute” (2010) 20 International Criminal Law Review 43, at 53-54. 
20 Young, “Internationally Recognized Human Rights’ Before the International Criminal Court” (2011) 
60(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 189, at 205. 
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supported by the practice of different regional systems. Secondly, and similarly, judges can 
supplement reference to regional institutions with references to the output of international 
human rights treaty bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Whilst 
such mechanisms are not judicial bodies, and questions can be raised as to the authority of 
their outputs,21 reference to them may help to show that approaches adopted by regional 
human rights courts are not regionally specific and have international support.  
Whilst the measures outlined above may help to reduce concerns about cultural bias in some 
instances, it may not always be possible for the judges of the ICC to draw from other 
international and regional mechanisms. Consequently, a third measure is vital. The judges of 
the ICC must provide clear reasoning as to how regional case law is being used in the 
Court’s reasoning and how reference to it fits with the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation.22 In doing so, the judges of the ICC can show that regional human rights 
jurisprudence is not being relied upon as a source of law in its own right, but as a means of 
identifying the sources of law that judges of the ICC have the authority to apply.  
E. The Rights of the Accused 
A second concern relating to the Court’s use of regional human rights jurisprudence is its 
implications for the rights of the accused. This risk flows from the differing functions of the 
ICC and regional human rights courts, the former being concerned with the criminal 
responsibility of individuals and the latter concerned with the civil responsibility of States. 
These functional differences necessitate distinctions in the applicable law of the ICC and 
human rights courts, as well as the methods of reasoning that they employ.  
It has been argued elsewhere that expansive interpretive techniques and methods of 
reasoning that have been developed to enhance the rights of victims in the field of human 
rights law are not easily reconciled with liberal principles of criminal justice and can 
undermine the rights of the accused if transferred into the field of international criminal 
law.23 A key concern is that reference to human rights jurisprudence may serve to expand 
the scope of criminal liability and violate the principle of legality, which protects individual 
from being held criminally responsible for conduct that was not criminalised at the time of 
commission.24  
                                                          
21 See discussion in Croquet, supra n 4, at 127-28.  
22 Young, supra n 20, at 206.  
23 See generally Robinson, “The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law” (2008) 21 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 925; Grover, “A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the 
Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (2010) 21(3) 
European Journal of International Law 543, at 550-51. 
24 For discussion of the meaning and scope of the principle of legality in the international criminal 
context, and its compatibility with progressive development, see Shahabuddeen, “Does the Principle 
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Concerns about the impact of the ICC’s engagement with human rights law on the rights of 
the accused are not confined to the interpretation and application of the substantive law of 
the ICC. Reference to human rights law in the determination of procedural issues could also 
have implications for the rights of the accused. This is particularly so when balancing the 
interests of victims with the rights of the accused in proceedings before the Court. The 
tension between the interests of these two stakeholders in the ICC’s proceedings is reflected 
in the provisions of the Rome Statute. The text of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, for 
example, recognises the tension between the interests of victims and the rights of the 
accused in the area of victim participation and emphasises the priority that must be 
accorded to the latter. 
The risk that reference to regional human rights jurisprudence could be used to expand the 
scope of criminal liability and support the procedural rights of the victims to the detriment 
of the accused again highlights the importance of clear reasoning on the part of judges. To 
counter the risk of unfairness, it is important that judges demonstrate awareness of the 
different functions of the ICC and regional human rights courts in their reasoning, ensure 
compliance with the ICC’s provisions on fair trial standards,25 and provide a clear 
explanation of how human rights jurisprudence is being used so as to allow the defence to 
make effective challenges where the rights of the accused are at stake. As with the risk of 
cultural bias, the risk of interference with the rights of the accused, whilst significant, can be 
countered through the adoption of clear judicial reasoning awareness of the differing 
functions of the ICC and regional human rights courts.  
 
3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The importance of clear judicial reasoning is enhanced by the ambiguous role given to 
human rights jurisprudence under the Court’s legal framework. The only reference to 
judicial decisions in the Rome Statute is found in Article 21(2), which allows the Court to 
“apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its [own] previous decisions”. 
Nonetheless, reference to external jurisprudence, including the decisions of regional human 
rights courts, can be “read in” to the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation. The 
key provision here is Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which outlines the Court’s sources of 
applicable law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development of Law?” (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1007, at 1012. Cassese, The Influence of European Court of Human Rights on 
International Criminal Tribunals – Some Methodological Remarks” in Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights 
and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbjørn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2003), at 49. 
25 These include Articles 22-24, 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute. 
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A. Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute 
Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute outlines the source of law that the ICC “shall apply”, 
namely:  
(a) “In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;  
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict;  
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States 
that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards”. 
Article 21(1) provides a number of possible openings for reference to regional human rights 
jurisprudence. The first openings are found in paragraph (a). Given the synergies that exist 
between international criminal law and human rights law, the decisions of regional human 
rights courts offer an obvious point of reference in the interpretation of the Court’s primary 
documents, namely the Rome Statute, the ICC’s Elements of Crimes and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  
As an international treaty, the Rome Statute is subject to the rules of treaty interpretation 
outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (Vienna Convention).26 
Reference to regional human rights jurisprudence can be read into different elements of the 
Vienna rules. It can be read into the “general rule of interpretation” set out in Article 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention, which centres around the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
treaty.27 The decisions of regional human rights courts could be used to ascertain the 
ordinary “functional” meaning of particular terms in the Rome Statute, or the meaning and 
scope of “generic terms”, which are intended to keep pace with the development of 
international law.28   
                                                          
26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 5. The Appeals Chamber 
of the ICC has endorsed the application of the rules of interpretation contained in Articles 31-32 of the 
VCLT in the interpretation of the Rome Statute. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, para 
33. 
27 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. 
28 For discussion of the “functional meaning” of treaty terms and “generic terms”, see Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (2008) at 166-67 and 172-73.  
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Another opening lies in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, which requires the 
interpreter to take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in 
relations between the parties”. This provision has been understood to incorporate a general 
principle of “systemic integration” into the Vienna regime, providing “express justification 
for looking outside the four corners of a particular treaty to its place in the broader 
framework of international law”.29 Whilst regional human rights jurisprudence, or even the 
regional human rights treaties that it relates to, cannot be considered to be “rules of 
international law applicable in relations between the parties” per se,30 such jurisprudence 
could offer assistance in the identification of customary international law or general 
principles of law, which would fall within the scope of Article 31(3)(c).  
It is important to note that the rules of interpretation outlined in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention are not exhaustive. Other interpretive techniques, which may be employed 
alongside the Vienna rules, could create further openings for reference to regional human 
rights jurisprudence. The principle of effectiveness and the evolutive approach to treaty 
interpretation have, for example, been described as “powerful techniques for the 
harmonization of legal regimes” and may entail reference to external case law.31  
In addition to the above, regional human rights case law may be used to assist in the 
identification of the sources of law referred to in Articles 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Rome 
Statute. These sources of law can be applied in the event that the issue at hand cannot be 
resolved by reference to the sources listed in Article 21(1)(a). Regional human rights 
jurisprudence may provide a valuable source of assistance when identifying “principles and 
rules of international law”, referred to in Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute. Whilst there 
has been some disagreement as to the meaning and scope of this phase, it is generally 
understood to encompass, at a minimum, rules of customary international law.32 Regional 
human rights jurisprudence may assist in the identification of customary rules. Indeed, 
                                                          
29 McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279, at 280-81.  
30 It is unclear whether the “parties” referred to in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention constitute 
the parties to the relevant treaty or to the particular dispute. See discussion in Pauwelyn, Conflict of 
Norms in Public International Law (2003) at 257-63. Linderfalk, “Who are ‘the Parties’? Article 31, 
paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited” 
(2008) Netherlands International Law Review 343. The issue is complicated further in the context of the 
ICC because the parties are not States, but individuals accused of having committed international 
crimes and the Prosecutor of the ICC.  
31 Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007) at 12 and 43-48.  
32 Pellet, “Applicable Law” in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2008) at 1071. Schabas, The International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) at 391. McAuliffe deGuzman, “Article 21: Applicable 
Law” in Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article (2008) at 707-708. 
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judges of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
have referred to regional human rights jurisprudence for this purpose.33 
The reference to “applicable treaties” in Article 21(1)(b) could offer a further basis for 
reference to case law that elaborates on the relevant treaty provisions. Whilst some 
commentators have considered the term “applicable treaties” to embrace regional human 
rights treaties,34 questions can be raised as to the extent to which such treaties can be 
understood to be “applicable” in the context of the ICC.35  
Lastly, decisions of regional human rights courts may be referred to in the identification of 
“general principles of law derived… from national laws of legal systems of the world”, 
referred to in Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Decisions of regional human rights 
institutions that include comparative surveys of domestic law and different legal systems 
may be particularly useful. The reference to “national laws of legal systems of the world” 
could also allow, implicitly, for reference to regional human rights jurisprudence in 
situations where the national legal systems decide cases in accordance with the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights mechanisms.  
B. Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute 
A further opening for reference to regional human rights jurisprudence lies in Article 21(3) 
of the Rome Statute, which requires that “[t]he application and interpretation of law 
pursuant to [Article 21] must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, 
and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status”. 
At first sight, this provision seems to provide a firm foundation for reference to regional 
human rights jurisprudence. However, the relevance of regional human rights jurisprudence 
in the identification of internationally recognised human rights can be disputed. Whilst, on 
the one hand, regional human rights courts can be seen as interpreters of internationally 
recognised human rights, it cannot be ignored that they operate in a regional context and 
apply law that contains regional variations.36 Neither the Rome Statute, nor its travaux 
preparatoires, offer guidance as to how “internationally recognised human rights” are to be 
                                                          
33 Schabas, “Synergy or Fragmentation? International Criminal Law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 609, at 625-26, citing Barayagwiza ICTR 
97-19-AR72, Decision, Appeals Chamber, 3 November 1999, para 40. 
34 Degan, “On the Sources of International Criminal Law” (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 
45, at 80.  
35 For discussion on this point, see Hochmayr, “Applicable Law in Practice and Theory: Interpreting 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute” (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 655, at 666-67.  
36 See supra n 19. 
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identified and what role regional human rights jurisprudence can and should play in the 
process.37 The issue is, consequently, one that must be resolved by the judges of the Court.  
Another controversy surrounding Article 21(3) concerns its impact on the application of the 
sources of law outlined in Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute. It is unclear whether the 
provision merely serves as guidance in the interpretation of the Rome Statute, or if it can 
also act as a basis to fill gaps in the Statute, or even to override the statutory text.38 Again, 
little assistance can be drawn from the text of the Rome Statute or the travaux preparatoires 
and has been left for resolution by the ICC’s judges. If Article 21(3) is understood to provide 
a basis to add new obligations or powers to the Rome Statute, or to override the text of the 
Rome Statute, it could provide a very powerful role for regional human rights jurisprudence 
at the ICC. 
Whilst the legal framework of the ICC provides numerous openings for reference to regional 
human rights jurisprudence, their scope and significance remain uncertain. Significant 
ambiguities surround the interpretation of Article 21(3) and its implications for the Court’s 
reference to regional human rights jurisprudence. In order to set the relationship between 
the ICC and regional human rights courts on a firmer footing, it will be necessary for the 
judges of the ICC to develop a clear and consistent approach to the interpretation of Article 
21 of the Rome Statute and, in doing so, clarify the role of regional human rights 
jurisprudence in judicial decision-making at the ICC.  
 
4. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LUBANGA CASE 
The conclusion of the ICC’s proceedings in the Lubanga case provides the first opportunity to 
review the Court’s approach to regional human rights jurisprudence throughout the course 
of its proceedings in a complete case. Analysis of the 595 English language decisions 
produced by the ICC in the Lubanga case highlights the pervasiveness of reference to 
regional human rights jurisprudence throughout the pre-trial and trial process at the ICC, in 
relation to a range of legal issues. It also reveals a lack of clarity as to the Court’s 
methodology for referring to and drawing from this body of case law. The analysis in this 
section provides a basis to discuss the implications of the Court’s approach in Sections 5.  
 
                                                          
37 The debate surrounding Article 21(3) during the negotiations in Rome centred on the desirability of 
specifying prohibited grounds of discrimination and the use of the term “gender”. See McAuliffe 
deGuzman, supra n 32, at 711- 12. 
38 For discussion see Akande, “Sources of International Criminal Law” in Cassese (ed), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP, 2009) at 47-47. Pellet, supra n 39, at 1080. Hafner and 
Binder, “The Interpretation of Article 21(3) ICC Statute: Opinion Reviewed” (2004) 9 Austrian Review 
of International and European Law 163, at 173-76. 
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A. Frequency of Reference 
One of the most striking results of the content analysis is the frequency with which the 
judges of the ICC have referred to regional human rights jurisprudence in the Lubanga case. 
The chart below shows the range of institutions that the judges of the ICC referred to in 
Court’s proceedings and the number of references that the judges made to each institution. 39 
 
Fig. 1: Institutions Referred to by the Chambers of the ICC in the Lubanga Case 
The information in the chart does not indicate why judges have turned to regional human 
rights jurisprudence, or how it has been used in judicial reasoning at the ICC. These issues 
are addressed separately in subsections below.40 Its significance lies in highlighting the 
prevalence of references to the decisions of regional human rights courts vis-à-vis other 
international, regional and domestic institutions. The number of references to the ECtHR 
was second only to the number of references to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), one of the Court’s predecessors. The IACtHR was the fourth 
most frequently referred-to institution, with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in third place. References to these institutions exceeded, by far, the number of 
references to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
a range of domestic courts and tribunals, shown on the right hand side of the chart.  
                                                          
39 For the purposes of quantifying reference to human rights jurisprudence, each of the 595 decisions 
included in the study was examined for reference to the decisions of regional human rights courts. 
Reference to several decisions from the same institutions, or the same decision repeatedly, was 
treated as one citation where the reference concerned the same legal issue. If it was unclear whether 
or not the matter being addressed should be treated as one issue or two separate issues, it was 
presumed that there were two. 
40 See below at Sections 4.B and 4.D. 
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References to regional human rights jurisprudence spanned all three judicial divisions of the 
Court. This shows that the practice was not specific to individual judges of the ICC and 
represents a widespread practice within the Court. In total, 38% of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
references to external jurisprudence were to decisions of regional human rights courts. The 
equivalent figures for the Trial and Appeals Chambers are 32% and 16%, respectively. The 
Pre-Trial Chamber referred to regional human rights jurisprudence as frequently as it did to 
the case law of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (a total of 23 references).  
It is important to note that the frequency of reference to external jurisprudence, including 
the decisions of human rights courts, in the judicial decision-making process could be higher 
than suggested by the information on the chart, which only relates to instances of cross-
referencing that are expressly cited in the Court’s decisions.  
B. Factors Influencing the Court’s Reference to Regional Human Rights 
Jurisprudence 
The ICC’s case law in the Lubanga case reveals two factors that have influenced the 
frequency of reference to regional human rights jurisprudence, namely the prior experience 
of the judges of the ICC and the interpretation of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.  
The impact of judicial background is apparent from a partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Pikis to a decision of the Appeals Chamber in January 2008.41 In his partly dissenting 
opinion, Judge Pikis explained his reasons for following the majority’s interpretation of one 
of the issues under appeal. He explained that he had already confronted a similar issue in 
the case of Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus before the ECtHR, where he had served as 
an ad hoc judge. Having noted his reasoning in that case, he concluded that “[t]he same 
holds true in the present proceedings”.42 The opinion provides a clear example of the 
transfer of legal reasoning through the movement of judges between judicial institutions. 
Just as judicial background has influenced reference to regional human rights jurisprudence, 
so too may the background of other staff within the ICC, including counsel for the 
prosecution and defence, victims legal representatives and legal officers within the Court’s 
Chambers. 
The decisions of the ICC also suggest that the high frequency of reference to regional human 
rights jurisprudence in the Lubanga case has been supported by the understanding that 
Article 21(3) provides not only a legal basis, but also a requirement for judges to take 
                                                          
41 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1433, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Lubanga Dyilo Against the Oral 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, Appeals Chamber, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis, 11 June 2008, para 3. 
42 Ibid, para 3. Judge Pikis cited ECtHR, Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus Application No. 
86/1996/705/897, Judgment of 9 October 1997, in which he had acted as an ad hoc Judge.  
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regional human rights law into consideration in the interpretation of the Rome Statute. The 
language of a number of the Court’s decisions in the Lubanga case reflects this 
understanding. One example can be found in an early decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which considered the materials to be submitted by the Prosecutor in support of an 
application for a warrant of arrest.43 Having emphasized that the Chamber “[would] not 
take any decision limiting [the right to liberty] on the basis of applications where key factual 
allegations [were] fully unsupported”, the Chamber went on to say that: 
“As required by article 21(3) of the Statute, the Chamber considers this to be the only 
interpretation consistent with the “reasonable suspicion” standard provided for in 
article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights and the interpretation of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in respect of the fundamental right of 
any person to liberty under article 7 of the American Convention of Human 
Rights”.44 
The quotation above suggests that Article 21(3) encompasses an obligation to interpret the 
Rome Statute in accordance with regional human rights law. In its footnotes, the Chamber 
noted decisions of the ECtHR and IACtHR relating to the relevant provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights.  
Another example can be found in the Separate Opinion of Judge Song to a decision of the 
Appeals Chamber concerning the participation of victims in appeals proceedings before the 
Court.45 Having highlighted that “[T]he interest of victims that justice is done also is 
recognized in the jurisprudence of the [IACtHR and the ECtHR]”, Judge Song argued that 
“[t]his jurisprudence should be taken into account when interpreting the term ‘personal 
interests of the victims’ in article 68(3) of the Statute, as article 21(3) of the Statute obliges the 
Court to interpret and apply the Statute in consistence with internationally recognized human 
rights”.46 Again, here, a connection is drawn between regional human rights jurisprudence 
and the obligation in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to interpret the Statute in accordance 
with internationally recognised human rights.  
In neither decision did the judges explain how the obligation to interpret and apply the 
provisions of the Rome Statute in a manner that is consistent with internationally recognised 
human rights gave rise to an obligation to take regional human rights law into account.  
                                                          
43 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against 
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 24 February 2006, para 12.  
44 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
45 On this point, see also Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint 
Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 Concerning the ‘Directions and Decision 
of the Appeals Chamber’ of 2 February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song, Appeals 
Chamber, 13 June 2007. 
46 Ibid, paras 14-16. Emphasis added. 
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C. The Subject Matter of the References 
Analysis of the Court’s decisions in the Lubanga case indicates that the judges of the ICC did 
not refer to regional human rights jurisprudence when interpreting the relevant crimes and 
modes of liability. This is perhaps due to the nature of the offences that were being 
addressed: the conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers rather than torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatment, which have been more frequently addressed by human 
rights courts. Reference was, however, made to the case law of the ECtHR when considering 
the interpretation of the substantive law of the ICC. In its final judgment, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged case law the ECtHR, which had been relied upon by the Defence, to the effect 
that “a criminal offence must be clearly defined in the relevant laws, and the criminal law 
should not be broadly interpreted to an accused’s detriment”.47 
Reference to regional human rights jurisprudence was far more pervasive in the Court’s 
reasoning on matters of procedure and evidence. Indeed, the decisions of regional human 
rights courts were referred to in addressing some of the most significant procedural 
challenges raised in the Lubanga case, namely the consequences of the failure of the Office of 
the Prosecutor to disclose potentially exculpatory material obtained under confidentiality 
agreements to the defence,48 and the ability of the Trial Chamber to change the legal 
characterisation of the facts under Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court.49 
Other issues that prompted the judges of the ICC to turn to regional human rights 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga case include the disclosure of material prior to the hearing on 
the confirmation of the charges,50 the standard of proof to be met by the Prosecutor in order 
                                                          
47 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra n 5, para 581.  
48 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the 
Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, Trial 
Chamber I, 13 June 2008, paras 77-81; Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘Decision on the Consequences of Non-
Disclosure of Exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to 
Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status 
Conference on 10 June 2008, Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008, para 46.   
49 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2069, Second Corrigendum to “Minority Opinion on the “Decision Giving 
Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of Facts may be Subject to 
Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court” of 17 July 2009, Trial 
Chamber I, 31 July 2009, paras 23-26; Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr 
Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 Entitled 
‘Decision Giving Notice To The Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts 
May be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, 
Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009, para 87.  
50 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a 
Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 2006, para 14.  
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to confirm the charges against the accused,51 compliance with the principle of legality in the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute,52 the implications of illegality in the arrest proceedings at 
the domestic level for subsequent proceedings before the ICC,53 the admissibility of evidence 
obtained during an unlawful search and seizure,54 and the use of anonymous witnesses in 
trial proceedings.55 
In relation to each of the issues listed above, regional human rights case law was used to 
find a solution to procedural issues that had implications for the rights of the accused. It 
should be noted that the case law of regional human rights courts has not always led the 
judges of the ICC to rule in favour of the accused. For example, when rejecting the 
submission of the Defence that “anything short of full Defence access to the Prosecution’s 
file would infringe upon Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s right to a fair trial”, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber supported its reasoning with reference to the case law of the ECtHR.56 
Regional human rights jurisprudence has been referred to in the Lubanga case not only to 
consider the meaning and scope of the rights of the accused, but also to determine the rights 
accorded to victims in the criminal justice process. In its decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparations, for example, the Trial Chamber of the ICC 
recognised the “substantial contribution by regional human rights bodies in furthering the 
right of individuals to an effective remedy and to reparations” and confirmed that it had 
“taken into account the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and the national and 
international mechanisms and practices that have been developed in this field”.57 
Regional human rights jurisprudence was also referred to in the Lubanga case when 
considering the right of victims to participate in the Court’s proceedings.58 In June 2007, the 
Appeals Chamber was called upon to address the question of whether or not the Victims 
Legal Representatives could participate in appeal proceedings relating to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s decision to confirm the charges against the accused. The majority of the judges in 
the Appeals Chamber held that the victims had not demonstrated that their personal 
interests were affected by the issue, as required by Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, thus 
precluding their participation in the issue being addressed. The reference to regional human 
                                                          
51 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 
January 2007, para 38.  
52 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra n 5, para 581.  
53 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-512, Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 October 2006, at 6-10. 
54 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1981, Decision on the Admission of Material from the ‘Bar Table’, Trial 
Chamber I, 24 June 2009, paras 22-27.  
55 Lubanga ICC-01/06-01/04-1119, Decision on Victims’ Participation, Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008, 
para 78.   
56 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-102, supra n 50, para 3. 
57 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to 
Reparations, Trial Chamber, 7 August 2012, para 186 
58 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-925, supra n 45, para 4. 
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rights jurisprudence is found in the aforementioned Separate Opinion of Judge Song, who 
noted the relevance of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and ECtHR on the issue:  
“The interest of victims that justice is done also is recognized in the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR)… While this jurisprudence does not stipulate that victims 
have a human right to participate in criminal proceedings, the findings of the IACHR 
and of the ECHR emphasize that victims of serious crimes have a special interest that 
perpetrators responsible for their suffering be brought to justice, and that this interest 
is protected by human rights norms. This jurisprudence should be taken into account 
when interpreting the term ‘personal interests of the victims’ in article 68(3) of the 
Statute, as article 21(3) of the Statute obliges the Court to interpret and apply the 
Statute in consistence with internationally recognized human rights”. 59  
The tendency of the judges of the ICC to draw from regional human rights jurisprudence 
when addressing the rights of victims in the criminal justice process indicates that the 
practice may feed into a key tension underpinning international criminal law: the tension 
between the rights of the accused, on the one hand, and the interests of victims and 
communities affected by the commission of international crimes, on the other. The 
implications of this practice will be considered further in Section 5.    
D. Use of Regional Human Rights Jurisprudence 
The sections below highlight four different uses of the jurisprudence, which can be observed 
in the ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga case. These uses indicate the impact that the regional 
human rights jurisprudence has had on the Court’s reasoning. 
(i) Recognition of the overlap between regional human rights law and the provisions of the 
Rome Statute 
On a number of occasions, the judges of the ICC have referred to the decisions of regional 
human rights courts simply to recognise the overlap that exists between the provisions of 
the Rome Statute and human rights law. An example can be found in a decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber in 2006, where the Court addressed the interpretation of Article 57(3)(e) of 
the Rome Statute, which allows the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to seek the cooperation of 
States in taking protective measures for the purpose of securing the enforcement of a future 
reparation award.60 Having noted the importance of reparations at the Court, the Chamber 
included a footnote citing regional human rights jurisprudence as evidence of the fact that 
“[r]eparations to victims of gross violations of human rights in the context of State 
                                                          
59 Ibid, paras 14 and 16. 
60 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-8, supra n 43, para 136.  
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responsibility has since long been a key component of human rights bodies”.61 The Chamber 
did not suggest that the case law had affected the Court’s reasoning on the issue at hand. 
The reference merely provided context for the Court’s decision.   
Similarly, when discussing the right of the defendant not to incriminate himself during an 
investigation by the ICC, outlined in Article 55(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber 
recognised that “[t]he ECtHR has concluded that the right for an accused not to incriminate 
himself constitutes part of the right to a fair trial”: a right that the Chamber recognised had 
been firmly incorporated into the Rome Statute under Article 55(1)(a).62 Again, the reference 
did not appear to add to the Court’s reasoning in any way, it merely recognised the synergy 
between Article 55(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and regional human rights law.  
(ii) Support for Conclusions Already Reached 
The most frequent use of regional human rights jurisprudence in the Lubanga case was to 
reinforce the conclusions that the judges of the ICC had already reached on other grounds. 
The judges of the ICC have frequently supported their conclusions or points of reasoning 
simply with footnotes containing relevant regional human rights jurisprudence. On 
occasion, they have stressed that the conclusions that they have arrived at are supported by, 
or consistent with, the case law of regional human rights courts in their reasoning. An 
example of the latter can be found in a decision of the Appeals Chamber concerning the 
failure of the Prosecutor to disclose potentially exculpatory material received under Article 
54(3)(e) confidentiality agreements. The Appeals Chamber agreed with the conclusion of the 
Trial Chamber that the final assessment as to whether or not material in the possession of 
the Prosecutor must be disclosed is to be carried out by the Trial Chamber.63 In drawing this 
conclusion, the Chamber observed that the approach of the Trial Chamber is “confirmed by 
the jurisprudence of the ECHR, to which the Trial Chamber referred”.64  
Another example can be found in the decision of the Judge Steiner, acting as Single Judge of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, concerning the disclosure of the identity of prosecution witnesses for 
the purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing.65 Having outlined her interpretation of 
the relevant statutory provisions, Judge Steiner noted that she considered her interpretation 
to be “fully consistent with the jurisprudence of the [ECtHR]”.66 Again, the decision suggests 
                                                          
61 Ibid, para 136.  
62 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2192, Redacted Second Decision on Disclosure by the Defence and 
Decision on Whether the Prosecution May Contact Defence Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 20 January 
2010, para 68.  
63 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, supra n 48, para 46.  
64 Ibid, para 46.  
65 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-108-Corr, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 19 May 2006, para 32.   
66 Ibid, para 32.   
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that regional human rights jurisprudence was referred to in order to confirm an 
interpretation of the Rome Statute that had already been arrived at.  
At times, the judges of the ICC have highlighted that their reasoning is consistent not only 
with the decisions of regional human rights courts, but also other international criminal 
tribunals and domestic criminal courts. For example, when addressing the failure of the 
Prosecutor to disclose potentially exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) 
agreements, the Trial Chamber noted that its finding that the right to fair trial includes an 
entitlement to disclosure of exculpatory materials “is established not only by the provisions 
of Article 67(2) of the Statute, but also by a review of the relevant international 
jurisprudence, and particularly that of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
ICTY”.67 It is worth noting that the decisions of the ECtHR that the Trial Chamber referred to 
went beyond those referred to in the relevant case law of the ICTY, suggesting that the 
judges of the ICC had reviewed the decisions of both institutions independently, rather than 
drawing references to regional human rights case law directly from the decisions of the 
ICTY. This is significant insofar as it reflects a conscious decision to draw from regional 
human rights jurisprudence alongside the case law of international criminal courts and 
tribunals.  
(iii) Clarification of Concepts Found in the Rome Statute 
In a small number of decisions, the judges of the ICC have indicated that they have relied 
upon the decisions of regional human rights courts to elaborate upon key concepts found in 
the Rome Statute. These decisions indicate a more significant role for regional human rights 
jurisprudence than confirmation of conclusions reached by other means.  
One instance where the judges of the ICC have acknowledged the impact of regional human 
rights jurisprudence on their reasoning can be found in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on 
the confirmation of charges, where the Chamber defined the standard of proof to be met by 
the Prosecutor for the purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing. In its decision, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber explained that it had “relie[d] on internationally recognized human 
rights jurisprudence” to define the concept of “substantial grounds to believe” in Article 
61(7) of the Rome Statute.68 The Chamber went on to highlight several decisions of the 
ECtHR where the Court had considered the meaning and scope of the same phrase. The 
wording of the decision suggests that the Court’s interpretation of Article 61(7) was based 
largely, if not wholly, on the case law of the ECtHR. No other reasoning was given to 
support the Chamber’s approach. A reference was, however, made to a report of the UN 
Committee against Torture to support the proposition that “the purpose of the confirmation 
                                                          
67 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, supra n 48, para 77.  
68 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-803, supra n 51, para 38.  
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hearing is limited to committing for trial only those persons against whom sufficiently 
compelling charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought”.69  
In a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in 2006, regional human rights jurisprudence was also 
presented as the sole basis for the reasoning of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the 
right to be present at the confirmation hearing under Article 61(1) and 2(a) of the Rome 
Statute “extends, in principle, to all proceedings from the initial appearance to the 
confirmation hearing”.70 The only reasoning given to support the conclusion of the chamber 
is a footnote referring to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and a 
decision of the ECtHR in which the judges had held that the provision applies throughout 
the entirety of the proceedings.71 
A further example can be taken from the decision of the Trial Chamber on the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations. In its decision, the Trial Chamber referred to 
regional human rights jurisprudence to support a number of conclusions on the modalities 
and scope of reparations. Decisions of the IACtHR were referred to, for example, to support 
the proposition that “[i]ndividual and collective reparations are not mutually exclusive, and 
they may be awarded concurrently”, that “[r]estitution should, as far as possible, restore the 
victim to his or her circumstances before the crime was committed” and that “[t]he 
conviction and sentence of the Court are examples of reparations, given they are likely to 
have significance for the victims, their families and communities”.72 Each of these 
conclusions was supported solely by reference to case law of the IACtHR. 
(iv) To Fill Gaps in the Rome Statute 
In most instances where the judges of the ICC have referred to decisions of regional human 
rights courts in the Lubanga proceedings, the case law has been used to assist in the 
interpretation of provisions of the Rome Statute, or to confirm interpretations of the 
statutory text. On one occasion, however, the Chambers of the ICC considered case law from 
the ECtHR in determining the applicability of a doctrine that is not referred to in the Rome 
Statute, or the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence: the doctrine of abuse of process.73 
                                                          
69 Ibid, para 38. Cites United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Report of the Committee 
against Torture, United Nations Document, A/53/44, Annex IX, para. 6. 
70 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-108, supra n 65, para 8.  
71 Ibid, footnote 9. 
72 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/05-2904, supra n 57, paras 220, 223 and 237, respectively.  
73 The Appeals Chamber of the ICC has described the doctrine as “a principle evolved by English case 
law constituting a feature of the common law adopted in many countries where this system of law 
finds application”. See Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of 3 October 2006 , Appeals Chamber, 14 December 
2006, para 26. 
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The applicability of the doctrine was initially considered following the attempt of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 19(2) of the 
Rome Statute on the basis that he had been unlawfully detained and ill-treated by Congolese 
authorities prior to his arrest under the warrant of the ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
recognised that the abuse of process doctrine “constitutes an additional guarantee of the 
rights of the accused” even when there is no concerted action between the Court and the 
authorities of the custodial State.74 It found, however, that the application of the doctrine had 
been “confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities” in 
connection with the arrest and transfer of the accused, with reference to the case law of the 
ad hoc tribunals.75 Since the issues in the Lubanga case did not relate to torture or serious 
mistreatment, and there was no evidence of concerted action between the ICC and the 
authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately 
dismissed the challenge. 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo appealed the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. In a judgment 
in 2006, the Appeals Chamber found that the doctrine of abuse of process could not be 
applied under Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute since the Rome Statute addressed the 
grounds for the relinquishment of the Court’s jurisdiction exhaustively in Article 17.76 The 
Chamber went on to recognize, however, that the doctrine of abuse of process had “a human 
rights dimension” and considered the scope for application under Article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute.77 The Chamber found that: 
“Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and 
foremost, in the context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial, a concept broadly 
perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety”.78 
Consequently,  
“Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights 
of the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms 
to put the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to 
do justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated 
and the process must be stopped”.79 
                                                          
74 Ibid, para 10.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid, para 34.   
77 Ibid, para 36. 
78 Ibid, para 37. 
79 Ibid, para 37.  
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The Chamber cited case law from the ECtHR to the effect that serious breaches of the rights 
of the accused by investigating authorities could render a fair trial impossible.80 It 
concluded, however, that there was no error in the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The 
Chamber had rightly found that breaches of the rights of the suspect or the accused “may 
provide ground for halting the process”, but that “none was shown”.81 It was not long, 
however, before the Trial Chamber imposed the first stay of proceedings, in June 2008, due 
to the Prosecutor’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory material covered by 
confidentiality agreements concluded pursuant to Article 54(3)(e).82 A further stay of 
proceedings was imposed in July 2010, in response to the Prosecutor’s refusal to comply 
with orders of the Trial Chamber regarding the disclosure of the identity of an 
intermediary.83 
The Court’s case law on the stay of proceedings for abuse of process confirms that Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute provides not only a rule of interpretation, but also a basis to 
incorporate new doctrines or principles, and consequently new powers, into the ICC’s 
procedural framework. More importantly, in the present context, it shows that regional 
human rights jurisprudence can play a role in supporting the Court’s reasoning to this end.  
E. The Legal Basis for Reference to Regional Human Rights Jurisprudence 
Putting aside occasional references to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, the judges of the ICC 
have rarely explained the legal basis for their reference to regional human rights 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga case. The decisions of regional human rights courts have 
frequently been cited to support an aspect of the Court’s reasoning or to help resolve a legal 
issue without any indication of how the reference fits within the ICC’s rules of applicable 
law and interpretation, or the weight that it has been given.84  
Where the judges have drawn a connection between reference to regional human rights 
jurisprudence and Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, they have not explained what role 
regional human rights jurisprudence has played in the identification of internationally 
recognised human rights referred to in the Article’s text.85 This is the case even where the 
judges have relied on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to incorporate a new power – to stay 
proceedings for abuse of process – into the ICC’s system of justice.  
                                                          
80 Ibid, para 38. 
81 Ibid, para 44.  
82 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, supra n 48.  
83 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2517, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation 
of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings 
Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, Trial Chamber I, 8 July 2010. 
84 This practice has also been observed in other studies on the ICC’s use of regional human rights 
jurisprudence. See Croquet, supra n 4, at 109. 
85 See also Sheppard, supra n 19, at 52. 
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One attempt to articulate the meaning and scope of Article 21(3) can be found in the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis in 2006.86 In his Separate Opinion, Judge Pikis considered 
that “[i]nternationally recognized may be regarded those human rights acknowledged by 
customary international law and international treaties and conventions”.87 Whilst this 
reasoning draws a connection between the rights identified under Article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute and the sources of law encompassed by Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, it does not 
provide a clear answer as to what role regional human rights jurisprudence can play in their 
identification.88 Furthermore, whilst it recognises that human rights acknowledged by 
customary international law and international treaties and conventions may be regarded as 
“internationally recognised”, it does not indicate whether rights included in regional human 
rights treaties can fall within the ambit of the provision. As Sheppard has highlighted, the 
reasoning of Judge Pikis “neither accepts nor excludes the possibility of a regional 
customary principle being sufficient, nor does it address whether, if something short of 
universality is permissible, to what extent it matters who is and is not bound by the rule”.89  
Consequently, whilst the ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga case show that the judges of the ICC 
have referred frequently to the decisions of regional human rights courts and have, at times, 
attributed those decisions significant weight, the judicial understanding of how reference to 
regional human rights jurisprudence this fits with the Court’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation remains unclear.  
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE LUBANGA CASE 
The decisions of the ICC in the Lubanga case reveal a large degree of engagement on the part 
of the Court’s judges with regional human rights jurisprudence. The practice of the Court is 
significant in light of the benefits referred to in Section 2, above.  
The Court’s case law indicates that the judges of the ICC are contributing to the coherence of 
international law in areas of concern to the ICC and human rights courts. The contribution 
of the judges is apparent in situations where regional human rights jurisprudence has been 
used to elaborate on key concepts found in the Rome Statute and to support the introduction 
of new powers into the applicable law of the ICC. Even where regional human rights 
jurisprudence has been used simply to support a conclusion that has been reached for other 
                                                          
86 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-424, Decision on the Prosecutor’s ‘Application for Leave to Reply to 
“Conclusions de la defence en repose au memoire d’appel du Procureur’”, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Pikis, Appeals Chamber, 12 September 2006, para 3.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Bailey, “Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute: A Plea for Clarity” (2014) 14 International Criminal Law 
Review 513, at 523-24. 
89 Sheppard, supra n 19, at 48. 
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reasons, cross-referencing has helped the ICC and regional human rights courts to “speak 
with the same voice” on a range of legal issues, from the meaning and scope of fair trial 
standards to the rights of victims to participation and reparations, and to identify synergies 
in the jurisprudence of the ICC and regional human rights courts which can be built upon in 
future years. The same is true where judges have referred to regional human rights 
jurisprudence simply to identify an overlap between the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
human rights law.  
The ICC’s approach to regional human rights jurisprudence in the Lubanga case can also be 
seen to have contributed to the quality of the Court’s case law. By referring to external 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga case, including that of regional human rights courts, the judges 
of the ICC built the foundation for the ICC’s case law with the benefit of the experience and 
expertise of established institutions. At times, the decisions of the ICC in the Lubanga case 
suggest that reference to regional human rights jurisprudence has not only served to 
introduce new ideas into the judicial decision-making process, but that it has also 
contributed to the depth of discussion on issues that have arisen for adjudication before the 
ICC. This is evident, for example, where the decisions of human rights courts have been 
referred to in separate and dissenting opinions, on points of law that have triggered 
disagreement between the Court’s judges.90  
Furthermore, the connection drawn between the ICC’s case law and the decisions of regional 
human rights courts has the potential to enhance the weight and perceived legitimacy of the 
Court’s decisions in the eyes of interested onlookers. The extent to which reference to the 
case law of regional human rights courts has, in fact, affected perceptions of the ICC cannot 
be determined by analysis of the Court’s decisions alone.  
The greatest concern raised by the ICC’s use of regional human rights jurisprudence in the 
Lubanga case is that the failure of judges to justify the practice by reference to the Court’s 
own rules of applicable law and interpretation and explain the weight that has been given to 
them could lead to indeterminacy and a sense of “ad hocism” in the Court’s jurisprudence.  
Writing extra-judicially, former President of the ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese, has raised a 
similar concern in relation to the use of regional human rights jurisprudence by the ad hoc 
tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR. In his analysis of the approach of the ad hoc tribunals, 
Cassese drew a distinction between a “wild” and a “wise” approach to external 
                                                          
90 See, for example, Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-925, supra n 45, paras 14 and 16; Lubanga ICC-01/04-
01/06-1311-Anx3, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Blattmann attached to Decision on 
Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters”, Trial 
Chamber I, 28 April 2008, para 10; Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1487, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the release of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008, dissenting opinion of Judge Georgios M. Pikis, 
paras 12-14.  
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jurisprudence.91 The former refers to the practice by which judges refer to external case law 
“directly to resolve the legal problem before them” without reference to the sources of law 
that they were permitted to apply.92 The latter describes an approach that reflects a “rigorous 
legal conception of the role and functions of international tribunals and the sources of law 
from which they may draw”.93 According to Cassese, the “wise” approach is to be preferred 
on the basis that an explanation of the legal logic behind a decision is required “not only for 
reasons of legal rigour, but also to satisfy the fundamental requirements of the principle of 
fair trial”.94 A “wild” approach has the potential to produce unfairness by preventing the 
defence from understanding and anticipating the approach that judges may take in future 
cases.95 
The approach of the judges in the Lubanga case, described in Section 4 above, reflects the 
“wild” approach to regional human rights jurisprudence under Cassese’s conceptual 
framework. The implications of this approach extend beyond the fairness and rigour of the 
ICC’s decisions. The absence of an explanation as to how regional human rights 
jurisprudence has been used in the decisions of the ICC could also undermine the 
legitimacy, and hence the effectiveness, of the ICC insofar as it reduces the clarity of the 
Court’s applicable law and raises questions about the source of authority underpinning its 
decisions.96  To avoid the risks associated with a “wild” approach to external jurisprudence, 
the judges of the ICC must explain how reference to the decisions of human rights courts fits 
within the ICC’s sources of applicable law and interpretation and the weight that they have 
been given whenever they are referred to.  
The importance of a “wise” approach to regional human rights jurisprudence is heightened 
by the Court’s disproportionate number of references to the case law of the ECtHR vis-à-vis 
other international, regional and domestic mechanisms. It has been highlighted above that 
throughout the Lubanga proceedings, the Court’s judges only referred to the two most well-
established human rights courts: the ECtHR and the IACtHR. The number of references to 
the ECtHR (46) was almost double the number of references to the IACtHR (25). On 
occasion, the judges of the ICC referred to the outputs of international human rights 
mechanisms in the Lubanga case, either alongside97 or instead of98 references to regional 
                                                          
91 Cassese, supra n 24. 
92 Ibid, p. 21. 
93 Ibid, p.20. 
94 Ibid, p.21.  
95 Ibid, p.21.  
96 Franck, supra n 9, at 713-35. 
97 See, for example, Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-108, supra n 65, para 13, footnote 10 (referring to Human 
Rights Committee General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), CCPR/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 
2 November 1999, para. 16); Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-424, supra n 86, Separate Opinion of Judge 
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human rights jurisprudence. However, references to the regional human rights courts were 
far more prolific. 
The Court’s focus on the ECtHR and the IACtHR in the Lubanga case is understandable. 
They were the two most well established human rights courts in operation at the time that 
the proceedings took place. The only other operational regional human rights court, the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ rights (ACtHPR), had a small body of jurisprudence 
at the time of the Lubanga proceedings, having delivered its first substantive judgment on 
the merits of a case in 2009.99 The length of the ECtHR’s operation and the quantity of 
relevant case law that it had produced explains the disproportionate number of references to 
the ECtHR vis-à-vis the IACtHR. Nonetheless, the data suggests that the certain regional 
values, particularly those of European nations, may be having a disproportionate impact on 
the ICC’s jurisprudence. The frequency of reference to the European and Inter-American 
institutions is particularly striking in light of the fact that the Lubanga case stemmed from a 
situation in Africa, as had all of the Court’s situations at the time that the Lubanga case was 
being heard. 
Against this background, a “wild” approach to regional human rights jurisprudence is 
deeply problematic. In order to counter concerns that the ICC’s reference to regional human 
rights will undermine the international nature of the ICC, it is crucial that the judges of the 
ICC provide clear reasoning, explaining how regional case law fits within the ICC’s rules of 
applicable law and interpretation. 100 This is important in order to show that regional human 
rights jurisprudence is not being relied upon as a source of law in its own right, but as a 
means of identifying or interpreting the sources of law that the judges of the ICC are 
authorised to apply. By indicating how reference to regional human rights jurisprudence fits 
within the ICC’s legal framework, the judges of the ICC can not only enhance the 
transparency of the Court’s decision-making, but also provide reassurance that reference to 
regional human rights jurisprudence is being used to assist in the identification of law that is 
of a truly international character.  
A second trend in the Lubanga proceedings, which underlines the importance of a “wise” 
approach to regional human rights jurisprudence, is the Court’s practice of using the case 
law to support the interests of victims as well as the rights of the accused. In the Lubanga 
case, regional human rights jurisprudence was not expressly referred to in the interpretation 
of the relevant crimes and modes of liability. Consequently, concerns relating to compliance 
with the principle of legality were not raised. Reference was, however, made to regional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
98 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 10 July 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, at para 21, footnote, 37 (referring 
to a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 
19, Violence against Women, 11th session, 1992, para. 7).   
99 Matter of Michelot Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal Application No. 001/2008, 15 December 2009.  
100 Young, supra n 20, at 206.  
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human rights jurisprudence when considering the rights of victims to reparation and in 
determining the scope of victim participation at the ICC under Article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute. Whilst these issues do not concern the scope of criminal liability, the Court’s 
interpretation of the rights of victims has clear implications for the interests, if not the rights, 
of the accused.  
The potential for regional human rights jurisprudence to affect the balance between the 
interests of victims, on the one hand, and the rights of the accused, on the other, increases 
the importance of clear legal reasoning on the part of the judges. A “wise” approach to 
external jurisprudence, which explains reference to regional human rights jurisprudence by 
reference to the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation, is necessary in order to 
allow the Court’s defence counsel to challenge reasoning that has negative implications for 
the rights of the accused and protect the fairness of the Court’s proceedings. Clear and 
transparent reasoning may also encourage restraint in the ICC’s use of regional human 
rights jurisprudence in areas where the rights of the accused are at stake and provide 
reassurance to actors beyond the Court of the strength of the Court’s reasoning where the 
interests of victims and the accused collide.  
 
6. BUILDING ON LUBANGA: CLARIFYING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ICC 
AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
In order to avoid the risks outlined above, it is important that the ICC develops and presents 
a clear and consistent approach to regional human rights jurisprudence, which explains 
references to such jurisprudence by references to the ICC’s own rules of applicable law and 
interpretation. In order to do so, questions must be resolved as to the meaning and scope of 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and its relationship with the ICC’s sources of applicable 
law, set out in Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, and the ICC’s rules of treaty interpretation, 
found primarily in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. 
The first set of questions goes to the significance of regional human rights jurisprudence 
under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. The role of such jurisprudence depends on whether 
Article 21(3) is being used as a basis to incorporate new principles or rules into the ICC’s 
system of justice or as a principle of interpretation, to shed light on the meaning and scope 
of provisions of the Rome Statute and its accompanying Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
and Elements of Crimes. Where Article 21(3) is used as a basis for the incorporation of new 
principles or rules into the ICC’s legal regime, a “wise” approach to external jurisprudence 
requires that those principles or rules have their basis in the sources of law outlined in 
Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, i.e. that they constitute either a principle or rule of 
international law (referred to in Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute) or a general principle 
derived by the Court from the national laws of legal systems of the world (as provided for in 
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Article 21(1)(c)). Regional human rights jurisprudence is significant insofar as it provides 
evidence of either source. 
It is relevant to note here that in its 2006 decision on the stay of proceedings in the Lubanga 
case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC considered that there was no room for application of 
the principle or doctrine of abuse of process under Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute because 
the Rome Statute dealt with the grounds for relinquishing jurisdiction exhaustively in 
Article 17, meaning that there was no lacuna in the Rome Statute allowing reference to the 
sources of law referred to in Articles 21(1)(b) and (c).101 It found that the principle could be 
applied under Article 21(3), but without a clear explanation of its legal basis under the ICC’s 
rules of applicable law.102 Whilst this approach allowed the Appeals Chamber to create a 
remedy for violations of human rights in judicial proceedings before the ICC,103 it left the 
source of the legal obligation being introduced unclear. Reference to the sources of law in 
Article 21(1) would have introduced greater clarity and rigour into the Court’s reasoning, 
thereby avoiding the negative implications of the “wild” approach to external jurisprudence 
discussed above.  
Where regional human rights jurisprudence is used in the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Rome Statute and its accompanying documents, the source of law being referred to rests 
in Article 21(1)(a). Regional human rights jurisprudence simply forms part of the 
interpretive material that the judges of the ICC can refer to in the interpretation of the 
Court’s basic documents. In the interests of clarity, and in light of concerns relating to the 
potential for reference to regional mechanisms to introduce cultural bias into the case law of 
the ICC, it is important that judges explain the weight that has been given to the decisions of 
regional human rights courts under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and the extent to which 
they reflect “internationally recognised” human rights. Reference to a range of regional, 
domestic and international mechanisms may help to provide evidence of the international 
nature of the rights being referred to.   
The second set of questions goes to the relationship between Article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute and the ICC’s other rules of applicable law and interpretation. Again, the issues 
differ depending on the use of Article 21(3). Where used as a basis to incorporate new rules 
or principles into the ICC’s system of justice, it is important that judges take a clear and 
consistent approach to any conflicts that arise between internationally recognised human 
rights, on the one hand, and the sources of law referred to in Article 21(1) of the Rome 
Statute, on the other. In particular, it is important that that a clear and consistent approach is 
taken to conflicts between the text of the Rome Statute and rights identified under Article 
21(3).   
                                                          
101 Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-772, supra n 73, para 34.  
102 Ibid, paras 36-39. 
103 See discussion in Bailey, supra n 88, at 536. 
31 
 
Where regional human rights jurisprudence is used in the interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, a “wise” approach to external jurisprudence would require explanation of how 
comparative reasoning fits within the rules that guide the interpretation of the Rome Statute. 
A key question is whether the practice fits within the interpretive framework set out in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), for example in Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention, or whether it lies beyond it. A further question concerns the resolution 
of a conflict between compliance with internationally recognised human rights conflicts and 
the interpretation of the Rome Statute under the rules set out in the Vienna Convention, for 
example where the ordinary meaning of a provision in context and in light of the object and 
purpose of the treaty conflicts with internationally recognised human rights. Such issues are 
already being raised in the case law of the ICC, highlighting the need for the development of 
a clearly reasoned and consistent approach.104  
Consideration of the issues outlined above on a case-by-case basis may produce a 
fragmented approach to regional human rights jurisprudence and create greater uncertainty. 
A set of judicially developed guidelines establishing the role of regional human rights 
jurisprudence in judicial decision-making at the ICC could, therefore, play a useful role in 
promoting consistency in the Court’s reasoning. By developing a framework which is rooted 
in the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation, the judges of the ICC could help to 
ensure that the risks associated with the Court’s engagement with regional human rights 
jurisprudence are reduced, if not avoided altogether.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga case indicate the emergence of a strong relationship 
between the ICC and regional human rights courts, particularly the ECtHR, in the early 
years of the Court’s operation. Content analysis of the ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga case 
reveals that the judges of the ICC have referred to the decisions of the ICC frequently and on 
a range of legal issues throughout the pre-trial and trial process. The analysis also shows 
that the decisions of regional human rights courts have, at times, been given significant 
weight in the Court’s reasoning. The Court’s decisions suggest that the practice has been 
driven, in part, by the wording of Article 21(3), which has been widely recognised as 
providing a legal basis, if not an obligation, to refer to regional human rights jurisprudence. 
The willingness of the judges of the ICC to refer to and draw from regional human rights 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga proceedings has beneficial implications for the ICC and the 
broader development of international law. Perhaps most importantly, judicial interaction 
                                                          
104 See, for example, Katanga and Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-3003, Decision on an Amicus Curiae Application 
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has contributed to the coherence of international law on matters of mutual concern for the 
ICC and human rights courts, thus adding to the clarity and, in turn, the strength and 
effectiveness of international law. The Lubanga case law also suggests that the Court’s 
engagement with regional human rights jurisprudence is contributing, in some respects, to 
the quality of the Court’s decisions. Engagement with regional human rights jurisprudence 
has also allowed the judges of the ICC to provide evidence of conservatism and support for 
their reasoning, which may enhance the perceived legitimacy of their case law.  
The greatest concern raised by the Court’s practice is the absence of a clear methodology for 
reference to regional human rights jurisprudence in the reasoning of the chambers. 
Throughout the Lubanga proceedings, the judges of the ICC have tended to provide little 
explanation for their reference to the decisions of regional human rights courts and how this 
body of jurisprudence fits within the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation, even 
in situations where the jurisprudence has been given significant weight. Whilst there are 
some occasional references to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute as a basis, or even an 
obligation, for reference to regional human rights jurisprudence, the judges of the Court 
have not clarified how regional human rights jurisprudence contributes to the identification 
of “internationally recognised human rights” and how Article 21(3) fits with the ICC’s rules 
of applicable law and interpretation more generally. The lack of clarity is problematic 
insofar as it creates indeterminacy in the ICC’s decision-making, which has implications for 
the law’s fairness, effectiveness and perceived legitimacy. Ambiguity in the Court’s 
approach to regional human rights jurisprudence is particularly concerning in light of 
further trends identified in the Court’s case law, namely the disproportionate number of 
references to the case law of the ECtHR and the willingness of the ICC’s judges to refer to 
human rights jurisprudence to support the rights of victims as well as those of the accused.  
In light of these concerns, it is important that the ICC’s reference to regional human rights 
jurisprudence is placed on a clearer footing. This may be facilitated by the adoption of a set 
of judicially created guidelines, which address the role of regional human rights 
jurisprudence in the ICC’s decision-making by reference to the ICC’s sources of applicable 
law and interpretation. By establishing a clearer basis for interaction between the ICC and 
human rights courts, and explaining the rationale for referring to regional human rights 
jurisprudence in the case law of the ICC, the judges of the ICC can help to secure the benefits 
of a strong interaction with human rights courts, whilst avoiding its risks.  
 
